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Abstract: 
In light of the spread of markets across the globe and deeper into daily life, this article argues for a 
more robust analysis and application of Karl Polanyi’s conception of (dis)embedded markets 
coupled with the performativity thesis authored mainly by Michel Callon.  It suggests that while 
disembeddedness as a concept is necessary for an analysis of contemporary financial markets that 
are increasingly self-referential, it is not sufficient.  Despite the suggestion of a gulf between 
Polanyian and Callonian economics, there are important similarities in the two frameworks.  These 
are considered along with the considerable differences all in an attempt to develop a more robust 
methodological framework for analyzing financial markets. Performativity, it is argued, can help fill 
the gaps in Polanyi’s embeddedness framework, albeit only when that concept’s tendency to produce 
aspatial and apolitical arguments are taken seriously.  The article uses an abbreviated case study of 
the development of U.S. financial derivative markets in the 1970s and 1980s to argue that markets 
must be considered in light of both their institutional and geographic entanglements as well as their 
(dis)embeddedness in systems of calculativeness and mathematical modeling.  Specifically the article 
analyzes the tension between the derivative origin story authored by Donald MacKenzie, which 
focuses on neo-classical pricing models like the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing formula, and 
my own empirical research, which suggests the urban-economic geography of Chicago played a key 
role in the development of these instruments. 
 
 
Key words: markets, embeddedness, disembeddedness, performativity, financial derivatives, Black-
Scholes, Polanyi, Callon, Chicago  
 
 
1. Introduction—Our Market Mentality 
 
 This article addresses one of the growing imperatives for economic geography and the other 
critically minded social sciences, namely to more rigorously and innovatively theorize the expansion 
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of markets across the global landscape (Berndt and Buckler 2009, 2011, Peck 2012).  Markets, 
especially those designed to regulate themselves, were one of Karl Polanyi’s main concerns, even 
though most of his empirical analysis focused on their 19th Century manifestation.  He believed the 
time of the self-regulating “market system” had passed with the World Wars.  If Polanyi (1886-1964) 
had lived a few years longer he would have witnessed the birth of a new market system that has 
expanded rapidly since the 1970s.  In particular, he would have seen the emergence of a market 
based model of financial management that over the next 30 years would drive Western socio-
economies toward many of Polanyi’s worst predictions through the marketization of “almost 
everything” (Leyshon and Thrift 2007).  Since the 1970s financial markets have become integral to 
most economic geographies (Pike and Pollard 2010) and the vanguard of processes of 
commodification of labor (Bryan and Rafferty 2006, 2011), land (Ashton 2009, Weber 2010), and 
money (Krippner 2011), the three venerable realms that Polanyi thought society would inevitably 
rise up to protect in the face of market encroachment (Polanyi 2001).  It seems, however, that 
despite significant resistance, financial markets only continue to grow in kind and influence, and the 
overall market “mentality”, despite Polanyi’s prediction of obsolescence in 1947 (Polanyi 1968), is 
more deeply engrained in our social institutions than ever.  How do we begin to explain this 
“orientation towards financial markets” (Preda 2009: 5), and what kind of methodology should we 
use to analyze a system where, fictitious or not, financial markets influence many of the political, 
social, and even cultural decisions we make? 
 I will argue in this article that a number of Polanyian concepts such as “disembedded” 
markets and “market society” provide a stronger theorization of the relationship between financial 
markets and the socio-economy than has previous been suggested.  But I will also suggest that a 
Polanyian institutional methodology is not sufficient to understand markets that are increasingly 
creating their own social contexts.  I will furthermore argue that economic geographers ought to 
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supplement Polanyi’s concept of the disembedded market with Michel Callon’s concept of the 
performed economy, a methodology that has much more in common with Polanyi’s arguments than 
is often suggested.  This theory of market performativity, which has been put to work by Donald 
MacKenzie and others, focuses on the expanding influence of neo-classical market logics, and has 
the capacity to conceptualize a process of market construction, from the inside-out, but without 
some of the most egregious assumptions of neo-classical economics.  The performativity framework 
also has weaknesses and gaps, most importantly its tendency to decontextualize and depoliticize 
processes of market construction, something a turn to Polanyi remedies.  I will not argue that either 
of these frameworks is analytically right or wrong, but suggest that together, two less than perfect 
frameworks provide a path forward for theorizing contemporary financial markets. 
In other words, a rigorous analysis of financial markets requires that we analyze both their 
inside, or their internal operations and logic, and their outside, or the broader context within which 
they reside and from which they depend for their reproduction.  To turn financial markets “inside-
out” then, is both an ontological and methodological argument.  It is to accept on one hand the 
basic argument that financial markets cannot exist without the broader socio-economy, whether in 
the form of the production of tangible use values necessary for daily social reproduction, or the 
production of reliable income streams necessary for securitization (Leyshon and Thrift 2007, Bryan 
and Rafferty 2011).  But it is also to accept that financial markets have expanded in size and 
influence to the point where the rest of the economy is subject to them, forcing us to grasp with 
their internal logic, not least in the ways that logic “overflows” (Callon 1998) and influences the rest 
of the world. 
 The article proceeds through four additional sections.  First I discuss Polanyi’s analysis of 
the relationship between markets and the social and economic fields focusing on the usefulness, but 
also the challenges of the concepts of embeddedness and disembeddedness.  Second, I analyze the 
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work of Callon, considering how his work attempts to overcome one of the key contradictions in 
Polanyi’s framework.  Third, in three subsections I use an abbreviated case study to show how these 
two frameworks can be used together to analyze the early growth of financial derivatives markets 
that were largely isolated in Chicago in the 1970s and 1980s.  I conclude with thoughts on the shape 
of a potential research program that grapples with real disembeddedness without abandoning 
uneven geographies or the political realities of assembling alternative markets and economies. 
 
2. Polanyi’s frame of reference 
 Those attempting to identify a theoretical core or the “real” meaning of Karl Polanyi’s work 
are engaging in a frustrating business.  As brilliant and innovative as his approach is, he seemingly 
contradicts himself on numerous occasions, not least in conceptualizing the embeddedness of the 
economy, his most influential idea (Krippner et al. 2004, Gemici 2008).  His empirical work focuses 
almost exclusively on economic history and the economies of “primitive” societies, and he spends 
little time discussing the details of contemporary capitalism (Peck, this issue).  Nevertheless, 
Polanyi’s reframing of laissez faire politics coupled with free-market economics as a dangerously 
utopian project was a crucial intervention that reverberates today across the social sciences.  As he 
outlines in his most famous work, the 1944 book The Great Transformation, Polanyi (2001) saw in the 
19th Century, especially England, the development of the first true self-regulating “market system” 
where the market economy was propelled by industrialists and state interests to the point where 
three key components of social life—land, labor and money—became mostly commodified and 
traded on “price-making” markets.  It is in the objectification and marketing of these three 
“fictitious commodities” that Polanyi saw the limits of the self-regulating market system (Polanyi 
2001: 71-80).  In the development of fictitious commodities Polanyi saw both the potential for the 
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“demolition of society” (76), but also the organic reaction of society to protect itself from 
annihilation, or what Polanyi called the “double movement”1. 
While Polanyi did not invest much energy in analyzing finance, save the 19th Century 
international gold standard (2001), three components of his socio-economic framework help us re-
imagine contemporary financial markets.  First, despite the paradox of the truly self-regulating 
market system that I will discuss below, Polanyi rejected the notion of a pure economic sphere.  In 
this Polanyi critiqued both neo-classical economics and Marxist political economy (Polanyi 1968).  
In both there is an analytical, if not ontological, pureness to economic activity; in the former, market 
fundamentalism and methodological individualism, in the latter, materialism translated through 
capital’s structural imperative to produce surplus value.  Polanyi, in some ways anticipating Gibson-
Graham’s (2006) argument, saw instead a variegated and hybrid economic system, where even in 
“advanced” industrial economies, components of “primitive” economic activity still play an 
important role (Polanyi 1957).  The implication is there is nothing teleological or essential to the 
emergence of markets, especially the intensified self-regulatory market2.  Instead, markets are 
historically, geographically and institutionally contingent, if not assembled directly by states and 
commercial interests. 
                                                     
1 This article does not address the double movement, although this idea certainly deserves more elaboration with regard 
to contemporary finance and reform movements such as Occupy Wall Street.  Along these lines there are deep 
implications to Polanyi’s double movement thesis for questions of the origins of “society”.  Instead of envisioning 
capitalist social relations and class struggle as constitutive of the economic system as in orthodox Marxism, in suggesting 
the concept of embeddedness, Polanyi argues that society is relatively autonomous, and while it “interpenetrates” the 
market in its participation with and resistance to it, society nevertheless stands for its own non-economic interests 
(Burawoy 2003).  On the other hand, the double movement suggests society only emerges in reaction, as in dialectically, 
to the commodification of labor, land and money.  Polanyi indirectly raises the question whether class struggle is a 
determined and constitutive component of capitalism a la Althusser, or whether there a relative autonomy to social 
agency that pre-dates capitalism all together (see Read 2003). 
2 Burawoy (2003), however, suggests there is a teleology in the double movement thesis, which suggests an imminence to 
the emergence of “active” or protective social movements as a reaction to commodification.  See footnote #1. 
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Second is Polanyi’s methodological suggestion that investigations of the economy should be 
“substantive” not formalistic3.  In this he means scholars should be focused on grounded 
investigations of how people meet their material wants and needs to achieve a “livelihood”, as 
opposed to the reductive and narrow focus on how and where markets operate and how they might 
be made more efficient (Polanyi 1957, Stanfield 1990).  Polanyi, in his substantive work as an 
economic anthropologist, theorized four types of economic organization, only one of which was the 
market (Polanyi 1957).  Alternatively, formal economic analysis is exclusively interested in markets, 
and as a result, abandons the study of the ends: individual and social development, for the means: the 
efficient distribution of scarce resources (Stanfield 1990).   
Third, and most contentious, but also probably the most useful Polanyian concept over the 
last 50 years, is the concept of embeddedness itself.  Polanyi believed economic activity was a 
“instituted process”, meaning that it was not an independent sphere of human life, but instead 
“embedded” or “submerged in social relationships” (Polanyi 2001: 48).  We might think of 
embeddedness then, as the inherent entanglement of economic activities in cultural, social and 
political institutions.  In other words, economic activity of all sorts is facilitated, entangled with, and 
can only be constituted by non-economic parts of life.  To the extent there is an “economic” sphere, 
Polanyi sees it as just another part of social life, albeit the part of life particularly concerned with the 
“livelihood of man from the material angle” (Polanyi, et al. 1957: 241)4.   
Fred Block has argued that what Polanyi really meant is that the economy is “always 
embedded” (Block 2003) or that the economy can never be truly disembedded from non-economic 
                                                     
3 Polanyi says, “The formal meaning implies a set of rules referring to choice between the alternative uses of insufficient 
means.  The substantive meaning implies neither choice nor insufficiency of means; man’s livelihood may or may not 
involve the necessity of choice and, if choice there be, it need not be induced by the limiting effect of a “scarcity” of the 
means; indeed, some of the most important physical and social conditions of livelihood such as the availability of air and 
water or a loving mother’s devotion to her infant are not, as a rule, so limiting” (1957: 243-4). 
4  A longer explanation appears later on the same page: “In the whole range of economic disciplines, the point of 
common interest is set by the process through which material want satisfaction is provided.  Locating this process and 
examining its operation can only be achieved by shifting the emphasis from a type of rational action to the configuration 
of goods and person movements which actually make up the economy.” (Polanyi, et al. 1957: 241-2). 
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institutions. To many in economic geography and proximate disciplines, this probably sounds 
reasonable, if not fundamental. There is no space here to do justice to a rich literature, but 
embeddedness has in various forms been regularly employed by geographers (see Hess 2004, Peck 
2005, Peck this issue) and other social scientists (see Krippner 2001, Krippner, et al. 2004, Dale 
2010)5.  Embeddedness does, however, present an analytical challenge.  On one hand if all economic 
activity is just another part of social life—albeit that part concerned with material livelihood—there 
is not anything essentially economic about the economic part of social life.  In other words, if the 
uniqueness of economic life is subsumed by socio-cultural life, there is no economy—as a separate 
sphere—to be embedded.  While Polanyi never directly addresses this predicament, his substantive 
methodology logically follows.  His methodological conclusion, in the face of imagining nothing 
essentially “economic” about life, is to engage in a broad and comparative research program across 
numerous societies and cultures focusing on the ways they organize the allocation of materials (Peck, 
this issue).  And yet, Polanyi also argues with regard to the market economy, that there is something 
quite unique about economic activity that deserves specific investigation—in other words, he sees 
something especially “economic” about markets.  In the end, Polanyi leaves us with a paradox 
(Krippner 2001, Krippner et al. 2004; Slater 2002; Gemici 2008).  As Krippner suggests, “researchers 
either study economic processes in social terms, in which case they abandon the sphere of the 
market [as something unique]; or, they study the market as a theoretical entity in its own right, in 
which case they purge all social content” (Krippner et al. 2004: 113). 
 Gareth Dale thinks these critiques have “on the whole missed their target” (Dale 2010: 198).  
He reminds us that Polanyi was suggesting that economic activity is not “always” embedded in 
                                                     
5 One significant literature I am not directly engaging is the New Economic Sociology (NES), which was in large part 
engendered by Mark Granovetter’s (1985) re-write of the concept of embeddedness.  In part this is because Granovetter, 
admittedly, made a significant break with Polanyi (cf. Krippner et al. 2004), arguing that markets are embedded not in 
institutions or society, but network relations.  See Peck (2005) for an extensive review of this literature that includes a 
discussion of the relationship between NES’s and Polanyi’s arguments (see also Caliskan and Callon 2009). 
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society, but instead in institutions.  Institutions, in all societies other than those dominated by 
market economies, are ruled by non-economic considerations, norms, and values.  But what about 
societies that are dominated by markets?  Polanyi suggests that institutions in a self-regulating 
market economy actually become “separated” from politics and society and eventually become 
dominated by the values of the market.  The non-economic considerations of these institutions 
become increasingly inconsequential, and to the extent that they are constituted by social relations, 
those relations are translated through rationalized market logic (see Dale 2010: 188-206).  Thus, 
Polanyi arrives at the suggestion that “… it means no less than the running of society as an adjunct 
to the market.  Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are 
embedded in the market system” (Polanyi 2001: 60) and a few pages later “a market economy can 
only exist in a market society” (74).  This is the disembedded market, or a market that constitutes an 
“autonomous zone” (Polanyi 1947: 63), separated from political and social motivations and yet 
substantially able to reproduce itself.  While the term homo economicus implies a transhistorical 
absurdity, we must ask the question whether in the context of a market society, actors have no 
choice but to behave according to formalistic rationality. 
 Unfortunately Polanyi leaves us few clues as to how we might specifically investigate 
disembedded market economies.  On one hand, Polanyi insists on a grounded, substantive 
investigation of the disembedded market that would takes full account of the actors and institutions 
that engender, surround, and reproduce the autonomous zone.  On the other, Polanyi insists on 
imagining markets from the outside, or from a non-market or social context.  He explains: 
Even in regard to the market system itself, the market as the sole frame of reference is 
somewhat out of date.  Yet, as should be more clearly realized than it sometimes has been in 
the past, the market cannot be superseded as a general frame of reference unless the social 
sciences succeed in developing a wider frame of reference to which the market itself is referable 
(Karl Polanyi 1957: 270, emphasis added). 
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This framing is fruitful when examining a socio-economy where markets play a small or moderate 
role. However, if a system develops where land, labor and money are commodified, and markets 
begin to constitute their own institutions and contexts, one might imagine the “wider frame of 
reference”, but would it be effective in explaining the largely self-referential market and the 
institutions that surround it?  Even though Polanyi promotes the substantive work of investigating 
the broader context, he never resolves the analytical problem of being trapped on the outside of the 
market looking in. 
 
3.   Callon: looking out for the market 
 Over the last 15 years Michel Callon has developed a variation of actor-network theory for 
the analysis of market processes.  In this he has attempted to overcome the society/economy binary, 
and as such the paradox of embeddedness (Slater 2002), as well as the debate between formalism 
and substantivism (Caliskan and Callon 2009).  However, while Callon disagrees with some of the 
basic tenants of Polanyi’s framework (2002), he produces a similar treatment of disembedded, or 
“disentangled” in Callon’s lexicon (1998, 2002), markets.  Callon is wary of the concept of 
institutions, but he is deeply interested how commodities and markets are constantly moving 
through a dynamic process of stabilization or “entanglement” with institution-like entities, followed 
by disassociation or “disentanglement” from those entities.  Like Polanyi, Callon promotes 
grounded empirical work, conceives of markets as contingent and constructed entities and is 
interested both in the socio-cultural processes that are weaved through market practices as well as 
neo-classical economics’ role in the creation of market legitimacy.  In fact, drawing directly on 
Polanyi’s theory of disembeddedness, Callon titled his first essay on the subject, “The embeddedness 
of economic markets in economics” (1998).   
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However, instead of placing markets in a larger social or institutional frame, Callon begins 
inside the market analyzing how market practices and technologies expand outward to frame a 
context that temporarily stabilizes a market.  Presenting markets as pre-social, or as Latour (2005) 
would say, as “assembling” the social, Callon dismisses the concept of society, at least as it has been 
used by most social scientists, as biased and counterproductive (Callon 1998).  Likewise, Callon 
abandons the concept of the “economy”.  Instead he focuses on processes of “economizing” and 
“marketizing” or how parts of the world become economic or market-like (Caliskan and Callon 
2009, 2010). 
These processes of marketization are defined by action, agency, and assemblage.  For Callon, 
an early collaborator with Bruno Latour and others in Science and Technology Studies (Mirowski 
and Nik-Khah 2007, Preda 2008), agency is never found in “the social”, and is rarely isolated in 
humans, but instead results from various combinations of human activity with systems of 
technology and knowledge.  These networks, or agentic combinations, form what Callon refers to as 
“sociotechnical agencements”, or “the idea of a combination of heterogeneous elements that have been 
carefully adjusted to one another” (2007: 319).  Similar to the notion of a “hybrid collective” (Callon 
and Law 1995), and with intellectual debts to Deleuze and Guattari, agencements are ephemeral, but 
all-encompassing configurations of reality.  As such, similar to Polanyi’s autonomous or 
disembedded markets, agencements in effect have no consequential “outside” (Caliskan and Callon 
2010: 8-10) as they draft their own contexts.  It is the relations between market components, 
particularly framing mechanisms, market devices, and scientific knowledge systems that constitute 
both the agency and the context of the agency. 
For Callon framing is integral to any process of marketization, as markets are largely a 
construction of boundaries where certain entities and behaviors become disentangled from other 
systems and temporarily stabilized as appropriate, rational, or even necessary (Callon 1998, see also 
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Preda 2009).  Crucially for Callon, market frames allow or even force economic actors to become 
temporarily “disentangled” from external concerns and behave “rationally”, or become “calculative” 
in the sense of homo economicus (ibid: 51).  Framing and disentangling, however, are not totalizing, and 
are never complete (Callon 1998: 19).  Callon thus also theorizes “overflows” or “externalities”, 
which are the always existing remnants of an economic agencement, that which is not directly 
applicable to calculative market exchange (Callon 1998).  Unlike Polanyi’s institutional framing, 
however, they are always emanating outwardly from the assembled logic of the market. 
Market devices are non-human, often technological entities that shape and reproduce market 
relations (see Callon, et al. 2007 for an overview).  Coined “prosthetics” (Caliskan 2007), these are 
things such as trading pits, computer screens, published or spoken prices, or financial analysts’ 
reports (Callon et al. 2007).  Devices are intimate members of market agencements, part of the basic 
makeup of market exchange and just as important as humans to the reproduction of market frames.  
Indeed, self-reproduction and the replication of the market are two of their key effects (Berndt and 
Boeckler 2011).   
Last, and borrowing directly from Science and Technology Studies, is the crucial 
contribution of technical or scientific knowledge, in this case economics, to the construction of 
markets.  Unlike methodological realism, where a natural scientist or neo-classical economist might 
assume the world operates independent of the object of their scientific investigation, Callon argues 
that conceptions of the economy authored by both academic and practitioner economists actually 
make the worlds of market exchange.  There is no line between economic knowledge and the 
economy for Callon; they are one in the same, constitutive of and dependent upon each other.  To 
argue otherwise he says “amounts to admitting that there does exist a thing—the economy—which 
a science—economics—has taken as its object of analysis” (Callon: 1998: 2), a position that he 
rejects.  It is from this assumption that Callon sets up his argument that economists off all stripes 
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create the economy by performing their economic theories.  Callon defines economic 
“performativity” as the idea that economics “performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather 
than observing how it functions” (Callon 1998: 2).  While Polanyi criticizes formal (neo-classical) 
economic theorizing as narrow and misguided, Callon wants to understand how that formalism 
directly plays out in substantive market constructions, or in other words, how the abstraction 
becomes the reality (ibid). 
The distinction with Polanyi’s methodology is important.  Even while Polanyi argued that a 
truly self-regulating market or disembedded market system could develop, he was always focused on 
identifying a broader social frame or set of human institutions in which to contextualize that market 
system.  Callon sees it differently.  He is mainly interested in identifying the components or 
“entities” that in their relations with each other constitute an essential—or calculative—market 
logic.  Theorizing the context outside of that market logic is a secondary concern in Callon’s 
framework.  For Polanyi, it is fundamental.  The challenge is to construct a methodology that takes 
seriously both the assemblage of market entities emanating outward—and—the broader context, 
whether geographical, historical, or institutional that lays the groundwork for the market system to 
begin with. 
 
4.0 The Ins and Outs of Chicago’s derivatives 
 I turn now to a short case study that demonstrates how these two methodologies might be 
put into practice in trying to understand the origin of contemporary financial derivatives markets. It 
is not possible here to detail this multifaceted story to the extent necessary to make a thorough 
intervention in the scholarship on financial markets—that is best left for another volume.  I will also 
not attempt to conclusively advance either the Polanyian or Callonian framework.  Instead I will 
suggest that both are valid—and necessary, and at least in this particular case, they are stronger when 
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used together. There are three reasons I have chosen this case study.  First, because it is one of just a 
few cases of market construction that has been analyzed from a number of different social science 
perspectives.  These include the perspectives of charismatic entrepreneurship and innovation 
(Melamed & Tamarkin 1996), economic necessity (Miller 1997), the performativity of financial 
economic theory (MacKenzie and Millo 2003, MacKenzie 2006), and finally my own research that 
crosses through all of these, but privileges geographic-institutional analysis.  Second, it is a critical 
case in the sense that from their beginning in the early 1970s, financial derivative markets began 
tying together other financial markets. This has contributed to the construction of a globally 
interconnected financial market system that has come closer than any other at producing a self-
regulating autonomous zone to which many other parts of the world are now dependent.  Third, this 
case has a distinctly geographical character since the vast majority of financial derivatives were 
traded in a single city, Chicago, from the time they were established in the early 1970s until the late 
1980s.  This geography is far from an accident of history.  On the contrary, it is in direct relation to 
this geography that these markets established juridical stability, political legitimacy, and the trading 
volumes or market liquidity necessary to fuel pricing models and expand precipitously in the 1990s 
and 2000s. 
First I will quickly define the various sorts of derivatives, all of which remain in use today. In 
this context the term commodity refers to bulk agricultural products and raw materials.  The simplest 
form of commodity market—that for immediate exchange and delivery—is called a cash or spot 
market. Simple forward contracts have been in existence since antiquity.  Forward contracts, which 
are usually customized for individual needs, establish a price, quantity and future exchange date for a 
commodity.  Futures contracts are forward contracts where the exchange date, quantity and quality of 
the commodity have been standardized, typically by a commodity exchange.  Standardization 
engenders more efficient exchange of commodities because the negotiation of contract details is 
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removed from the process.  Crucially, it also provides parties that have no interest in the actual 
delivery of a commodity to speculate on price changes, as standardization engenders a more liquid 
market.  Instead of contracting for wheat, pork bellies or lumber, financial futures are contracts for the 
future exchange of a currency, stock, bond or other financial instrument.  Options are similar to 
futures, although instead of an obligation to exchange, it is an option.  Derivative is a broad category 
representing all kinds of forwards, futures, options, as well as many of the specialized and/or hybrid 
instruments commonly used today. 
Since the 1850s Chicago has been the home of the most innovative agricultural commodity 
and futures exchanges in the world.  Much later Chicago also became the home of the first 
successful centralized financial futures markets.  In 1972 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
began trading futures contracts on seven foreign currencies (Powers 1974).  About a year later the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBoT) began trading option contracts on single equities or stocks 
(Commodities 1974, MacKenzie and Millo 2003).  In 1975 the CBoT began trading the first interest 
rate contract, and a year later the CME began trading futures on U.S. Treasury Bills.  From there 
these markets expanded rapidly into Eurodollar futures, commercial paper futures, stock index 
futures, and more (Rodengen 2008, Lambert 2011).  In 1982 with the advent of stock index futures, 
financial futures traded more in dollar value than agricultural futures, and the Chicago exchanges 
never looked back (Economist 1-4-1986).  As the 1980s progressed, innovation and trading volume 
of exchange traded derivatives grew rapidly, and the markets spread around the globe (see Gorham 
and Kundu 2012).  In addition, markets for off-exchange or over the counter (OTC) derivatives 
traded directly between banks began to grow quickly.  By the mid 90s, the volume of OTC 
derivatives out paced exchange traded instruments, and continued to expand rapidly reaching 
approximately U.S. $700 trillion in notional value in the second half of 2011, approximately 10 times 
the amount traded on exchanges (Bank of International Settlements 2012). 
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4.1 Modeling derivatives 
Numerous factors contributed to the dramatic innovation of these instruments.  Building off 
of Callon’s performativity thesis, MacKenzie (2006) places the technical knowledge produced by 
financial economists at the center of his explanation.  His argument, which is more nuanced than 
can be represented here, is financial economic theory was performed by a conjunction of actors and 
technologies to produce a world similar to that outlined in the abstract economic theories.  In the 
culmination of his argument MacKenzie suggests that the performance of financial economic theory 
actually transformed derivative markets so they more closely resembled the theories in ways they did 
not prior to the performance.  Explaining the key role that new technical knowledge played in the 
development of these instruments he says, derivatives “…did not simply ‘evolve’.  They were 
invented” (MacKenzie 2007: 359, emphasis in original).   
The most important technical innovation in financial economics was the development of an 
option pricing model.  After about 20 years of academic theorizing and testing by a small group of 
graduate students and Ph.D. economists, in 1973 Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, and shortly 
thereafter Robert C. Merton (hereafter BSM), published an equation to mathematically estimate the 
“correct” price of a stock option.  Prior to this, traders of options had no reliable scientific method 
for deciding whether an option was over- or under-valued.  They had to rely on the same 
information as those who bought and sold the underlying stocks.  In other words, they had to guess 
the volatility of the underlying stock price, meaning how the price would change over time, and 
therefore how much the option was worth.  By making a number of assumptions about these 
markets, assumptions that may not have been realistic in the actual world, but nevertheless fit well 
with academic modeling of their predecessors, BSM were able to apply probability theory to stock 
volatility and thus predict a price.  This mathematically derived price could then be compared with 
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the actual price in the market. If there was a difference, it offered traders a profit opportunity 
because they assumed they actual price would inevitably move towards the mathematically derived 
price (MacKenzie 2006).  Financial economics also predicted that these price discrepancies would 
immediately close because of the “no arbitrage” assumption in another financial theory that grew to 
prominence in the 1970s, the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  This theory argued that rational market 
actors always execute trades to take advantage of new information (Fama 1970). 
In 1973, the same year the option formula was published, the CBoT opened an equity 
options exchange, which became the perfect laboratory for BSM, et al.  On the new CBoT 
exchange, the prices did indeed move closer to the mathematical prediction (MacKenzie 2006).  In 
the first few years after the equation was published there were still significant gaps between the 
theoretical and market price, but as more traders began using the formula, and hence acted 
according to the theorized market rationality, this gap closed to the point where for a few years in 
the late 1970s there was almost no difference between the two prices.  This was aided by Fischer 
Black’s new firm that used high powered computers to produce price sheets which they sold to 
traders who carried them into the trading pits (MacKenzie 2006: 161). 
Significantly, the BSM equation depended on unrealistic assumptions about the market: all 
investors have the same information, all arbitrage opportunities are immediately closed, and 
transaction costs are zero.  MacKenzie suggests these assumptions became more realistic as the 
result of higher trading volumes that fueled decreased commission charges and collateral borrowing 
costs (2003, 2006).  And yet, regardless that the assumptions were never perfectly realized, at least 
for a few years, the prices converged.  MacKenzie concludes that, as bounded as it might have been, 
and with the help of numerous assemblages of actors and devices, the BSM equation created its own 
frame or “world” (2003). 
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The application of the BSM equation, not only affected the equity option market, but it also 
fundamentally tied the option market to the underlying stock market itself (MacKenzie 2004, 2006).  
Of course, they were always related, but the BSM made them symbiotic  In a kind of reverse 
engineering, instead of using the equations to derive a theoretical derivative price, the actual market 
price can be plugged into the equation to suggest a theoretical or “implied” volatility for the 
underlying asset (see Bernstein 2005: 218-219, MacKenzie 2006).  A similar comparison to that 
between theoretically derived and actual prices in the option market can be made in the market for 
actual stocks, since all exchangeable asset prices contain an expectation of future price (Keynes 
1964).  As a result, the market for the underlying stocks became dependent upon the market price of 
its option, all of which were dependent upon probability models. 
The original work done by financial economists at universities and practitioner economists at 
the CBoT was quickly extrapolated and applied to virtually all futures markets. In effect the same 
relationships developed between most other futures and options, and their underlying asset markets 
(Ayache 2010).  The usefulness of BSM and similar theories was intensified by increasingly powerful 
computers and this encouraged rapid growth in these markets. In essence, the BSM and its cognates 
changed the functioning of financial markets so they became dependent upon not just mathematics 
and statistical probability, but the relative validity of the assumptions of the probability models.   
However, like many financial instruments, derivative contracts are only as good as the 
liquidity of the market they trade in (Nesvetailova 2010, Gorham and Kundu 2012). Objectively, 
there is no problem with this, especially in markets for broadly traded instruments such as stocks.  
As long as everyone is making the same assumptions and guiding their arbitrage decisions according 
to similar models of the financial markets, the BSM dominated market, largely disentangled from any 
notion of socio-economic institutions, constantly adjusts itself to changing market conditions.  It 
matters little whether the probability models or the assumptions they are built on are objectively 
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correct.  The lack of a “larger frame of reference” is irrelevant as long as market actors can always 
retreat to the liquid market to find out how other actors are assessing any particular situation in the 
“real” world. 
However, if for some reason, the markets stopped trading or even just slowed, how would 
the models adjust and how would assets be evaluated?  In the autumn of 2008 an accelerating drop 
in the price of homes led to the collapse of prices of numerous collateralized debt instruments that 
were built upon complex mathematical models that were dependent upon constant price updates 
(Lewis 2011). When suddenly Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in September of 2008, the credit 
default swap market, a derivative market derived from the collateralized debt obligation market, 
almost stopped trading.  This was a serious problem on its own for firms like AIG, but the bigger 
problem was that is meant banks could no longer predict the prices of mortgage backed securities of 
any kind, which meant they lost one of the key indicators of the “correct” price of any monetary 
debt, and this in turn meant that banks could no longer predict the future price of money itself.  As 
a result, the trading of credit and debt, along with much of the “real” economy, virtually stopped.  
Suddenly the derivative markets, not to mention the housing market itself, that for a short time had 
been disentangled and largely self-referential, was quickly re-entangled with conditions of actual 
defaulting homeowners, government agencies, and electoral politics.  
By focusing on the ways scientific knowledge is brought into practice or performed in 
particular socio-technical agencements we can see one way a market system as an autonomous zone 
operates.  This is part of a methodology that can be used to analyze actually existing and 
reproducing markets that have few references points outside of the price mechanism.  But what 
happened to Polanyi’s wider frame of reference?  At a time of socio-economic crisis, it seems more 
important than ever to analyze the dramatic and sometimes devastating impacts derivative markets 
can have on other economic, social, and cultural fields especially when the market system collapses.  
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In focusing too much attention on the ephemeral agencement or the agentic performance, there is a 
risk of missing other important questions.  How did financial derivatives achieve political and 
cultural legitimacy?  How are they interconnected with broader social, economic and political 
dynamics?  How can we change the system of speculative finance so that it is less apt to cause 
widespread economic upheaval in the future? 
 
4.2   Chicago’s derivative geography 
 A performative analysis of these markets is challenged to answer these questions.  In my 
own empirical work on Chicago’s financial futures exchanges, I have used an institutional or political 
economic analysis, informed by among other things, Polanyi’s theory of embeddedness, albeit one 
where geographic theory plays a more important role than in Polanyi’s original work.  My research 
has focused on how Chicago as an urban space played a role in the development of financial 
derivatives.  Given Chicago’s history as a center of agricultural commodities and futures trading 
(Cronon 1991), it may seem intuitive that Chicago became home to the most innovative futures 
contracts in the 1970s and 80s (Rodengren 2008, Gorham and Kundu 2012).  Explaining how it 
became a center of finance, however, is more difficult, but in the end helps explain how these markets 
became relatively self-referential, or disembedded.  In the following paragraphs I will briefly discuss 
three interrelated components of the development of Chicago’s exchange traded derivatives that 
show that even though financial economics played an important role, these markets were also, at 
least in the beginning, deeply embedded in the economic geography of Chicago.  The arguments I 
briefly outline here are based archival readings of U.S. Congressional proceedings and industry trade 
journals, and in-depth interviews with key market participants, regulators and observers. 
To begin with, the specialized knowledge of Chicago-based lawyers, bankers, traders, 
economists, and politicians was crucial to the development of the first futures contracts. The skills 
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needed to successfully trade in Chicago’s pits were learned and passed down through families and 
close personal relationships.  One former chairman of the Chicago Board of Trade described 
Chicago’s unique trading environment and ability to build liquid markets this way: 
We had a way here in Chicago of growing traders like the Swiss grow bankers and the 
Italians grow tailors.  It’s not that we trained people, but you learned by mentoring, you 
learned by watching, you learned by observing, and it was just a great school.  Which you’ll 
see when you go on the floor.  I mean this building, it’s amazing what goes on in this 
building.  Even in this little office, it’s amazing what goes on.  It’s like a great reservoir of 
information… So we had this great crucible, this great reservoir of talent here.  It was like 
street talent, street smarts, ah, cunning, cleverness, boldness, thinking outside the box, 
because we had to, to survive. 
[…] 
We have had a great history here going back to the 1800s of people making markets.  It’s 
something that we pass on.  Like my son.  He did the same thing.  We go down and we 
make a bid and we make an offer and it’s kind of engrained in the families if you will….we 
just teach people, it doesn’t make any difference if you’re buying or selling, it’s how you 
manage the trade (personal interview 3-6-12). 
 
Others interviewees made similar comments, and other analysts of Chicago’s derivative markets 
have made similar arguments (cf. Zaloom 2006).  Furthermore, it was agricultural traders that traded 
the first financial futures, stepping out of their home pits to trade the new currency contracts at the 
CME (Melamed and Tamarkin 1996) and equity option contracts at the CBoT (Lambert 2011). 
Once a trade is executed in a trading pit, another series of work processes begin, as behind 
the scenes these contracts are quite complicated.  The counterparties to the trade must be identified 
and matched to the contract, the collateral surveilled on a daily basis, and ultimately when the 
contract expires, monies and possibly actual assets must be delivered to the appropriate accounts.  
Before any of this can happen, the contract has to be built by the exchange, which means the 
underlying assets must be parsed into appropriate units; standardized settlement dates that are 
attractive to traders and investors must be chosen; and bankers and clearing firms must agree to 
shoulder the risks of contract non-performance.  The contracts must also be crafted by lawyers 
specializing in futures law so that the contracts will stand up to Congressional and juridical scrutiny.  
Far from suddenly acquiring the knowledge, trust, and interpersonal relationships necessary to 
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support these new markets at the moment when financial economics reframed them as formally 
rational, this knowledge was built up over many years of trading agricultural futures.  Contrary to 
MacKenzie’s argument that these instruments did not evolve, but were invented, I would suggest 
that this sort of institutionalized knowledge base did not emerge alongside financial futures, but 
instead developed in Chicago over a long period of time as the banks, law firms, and exchanges 
learned to manage enormous quantities of agricultural products and other raw materials that moved 
through Chicago’s agro-industrial economy (see Sassen 2006).  In fact, this specialized knowledge 
and trust was a prerequisite for their successful development.  Furthermore, as many of my 
interviewees indicated, the knowledge needed to construct and execute futures contracts is 
significantly different from that needed for a securities or banking market, so it was more difficult to 
replicate in New York for instance. 
 Second, the U.S. regulatory regime that was built to govern financial futures emerged directly 
out of the previous regime that governed agricultural commodities and futures (Markham 1987) and 
had deep connections specifically to Chicago’s institutionalized exchanges (Melamed and Tamarkin 
1996).  Beginning in 1922, when commodity exchanges were first subject to federal oversight, the 
regulations and regulators were weak, and unlike the securities and banking industries, this precedent 
has never truly been broken.  The securities industry, taking much of the blame for the 1929 crash 
and The Great Depression, became subject to much stronger oversight as a result of the 1933 and 
1934 Securities Acts which established the independent Securities and Exchange Commission (see 
Markham 1991, Seligman 2003).  The Commodities laws were reformed in 1936, and more 
significantly in 1974, but even then, little power was vested in the regulatory agencies. 
When a regulatory overhaul for futures markets became imminent in the mid 1970s, the 
Chicago exchanges realized they needed a stronger political presence in Washington, D.C. (Markham 
1987, Griesing and Morse 1991, Melamed and Tamarkin 1996, Millo 2007).  Concerned that futures 
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may have been causing price volatility, there was widespread desire, voiced mainly by Midwestern 
(farm state) congress people to establish an agency modeled after the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) that was responsible for the securities markets (Markham 1987).  Some thought 
oversight for the futures markets should be merged into the SEC. But, since the 1920s the main 
oversight of the futures markets fell under the Agriculture Department, and as such under the 
Agricultural committees in the two houses of Congress, as opposed to the Banking committees that 
had oversight over the SEC.  The Chicago exchanges fought hard in the 1974 reforms to establish a 
new, independent agency with exclusive jurisdiction over the futures markets, and they won that 
battle in the establishment of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) (Markham 
1987, Millo 2007).  Since then there have been ongoing jurisdictional battles between the two 
agencies, and numerous attempts to merge the CFTC with the SEC, but Chicago’s exchanges and 
the futures industry at large always fought hard to prevent this.  When I asked the long serving (30 
year: 1982-2012) president of the main Washington D.C.-based futures industry lobbying 
organization how important keeping the two agencies separate and keeping sole jurisdiction over 
derivatives with the CFTC, he said: 
“Let me just say, those are the two things that accounted for the tremendous growth of the 
industry and the innovation.  I don’t think it would have happened otherwise.” 
 
Follow up question: “When the rubber really hits the road, why is that?”  
 
Answer: “One reason is I think that the SEC would have screwed down on every new 
product, because they still thought fifty percent margin applied to everything.” (personal 
interview 9-24-12) 
 
The industry was able to accomplish this in part because they had significant influence over the 
CFTC through close ties to the Illinois Congressional delegation, the members of whom regularly 
found their way onto the agriculture committees (Griesing and Morse 1991, Melamed and Tamarkin 
1996).  Former CFTC and SEC chair people and commissioners were regularly hired to serve on the 
Boards of Directors of the two exchanges, and many of the lawyers and Congressional aides that 
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wrote the CFTC statutes and regulations were later hired by the Chicago exchanges (Griesing and 
Morse 1991; Melamed and Tamarkin 1996).  In the late 1970s, the exchanges invited and paid for 
“no fewer than 85 senators and nearly 200 congressmen” to travel to Chicago to visit and be wined 
and dined by the exchanges, in addition to receiving an honorarium of $2,000 from the exchanges 
(Melamed and Tamarkin 1996: 272).   
Why did Chicago fight so hard for influence in Washington D.C.?  The obvious answer is so 
they could create and maintain the most favorable environment for profit making, which included 
taking advantage of the implicit legitimacy provided by federal oversight.  Part of it was also to 
ensure quick approval of new contracts (Millo 2007).  More important were their ongoing fights 
against increased margin or collateral requirements, stricter position limits, and transaction taxes, all 
of which had the potential to scare away speculative traders who were desperately needed to create 
market liquidity necessary for their new financial contracts to succeed (Gorham and Kundu 2012).  
Chicago, with its long history of speculative “local” traders, usually won, but competition between 
exchanges to achieve liquidity first were fierce because they determined which exchange would be 
able to sustain trading volume in a new contract.  Furthermore, as time passed and “no arbitrage” 
mathematical models became more important to identifying theoretical prices, liquidity became the 
lifeblood of any contract because it demonstrated that new information was always being absorbed 
into market prices.  Since the 1930s the Federal Reserve and SEC have controlled the collateral 
requirements in the securities markets, but to this day the futures exchanges set their own collateral 
levels allowing them to more directly promote increased liquidity.  As they had since the 19th 
Century, the Chicago futures markets fought tooth and nail to convince anyone that would listen 
that they were their best regulators, and for the most part they were successful in regulating 
themselves and promoting that success to those that might impose outside restrictions. 
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The important point is the U.S. federal government, whether through active involvement, 
implicit approval, or deliberate inaction, played a crucial role in setting the stage for the growth of 
derivatives markets.  Certainly in making the decisions that determined the evolution of these 
markets, there were momentary disentanglements of actors and actants from long-standing 
institutional entanglements.  But there were also structural trends, long standing institutional 
differences between government agencies and the development over time of a government-industry 
relationship that protected the Chicago exchanges from the “enemies of futures markets, of which 
there were plenty” (Melamed and Tamarkin 1996: 216). 
 Third, much of this institutional knowledge and political work was translated through the 
discourse and practice of commodities and futures law.  Financial futures, especially as developed in 
the 1970s, were legally defined less by their internal qualities or their relational qualities to finance 
and money, but rather by their institutional character.  By this I simply mean that the early financial 
futures were not defined as financial instruments or investments, but instead as traded commodities or 
futures, the institutional home of which had a deep and meaningful history in Chicago.  One of the 
foremost experts on commodities and futures law explains: 
An understanding of commodities regulation must begin with an appreciation of its 
ambiguity.  The most fundamental concepts and features of the regulatory framework are 
often undefined or ill-defined.  The key phrase “contracts of a sale of a commodity for 
future delivery”—the basic futures contract—is nowhere defined in the federal statute, the 
Commodity Exchange Act (Johnson 1982: xxv). 
 
And a few pages later: 
 
A fair reading of the amended and expanded definition of commodity suggests that, as for 
“all goods and articles…and all services, rights and interests,” their status as statutory 
commodities does not emerge until they become the subject of futures trading.  While this method of 
converting something into a commodity may seem curious, it illustrates an important 
principal of commodities regulation: its interest is in a form of economic activity rather than 
in the attributes or character of the underlying subject.  The economic activity in question is 
futures trading; the nature of the commodity does not affect the regulatory result.  (Johnson 1982: 4-5, 
emphasis added).  
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This invites us to embed the earliest financial derivatives, not just in the history and law of futures 
trading, but even more significantly, in the history of the laws governing agricultural commodities 
trading much of the precedent of which is based on the Chicago exchanges’ court battles going back 
to the 1870s (Lurie 1979, Markham 1987).  Johnson goes on to explain the significant differences 
between securities law and commodities law, both of which also have significant differences from 
banking law.  But while the New Deal federal banking and securities acts of 1933 and 1934 
considered the connections between, and then actively separated securities trading and banking, this 
never happened between commodities trading and banking, or commodities trading and securities.  
Commodities and thus, futures, which became “derivatives”, were rarely considered in the context 
of speculative bubbles or systemic risk.  They were placed in a different category from finance—and 
Chicago wanted it that way.  Nevertheless, as the U.S. and global political economy transformed in 
the 1990s and 2000s, futures or “derivatives” became a centerpiece of commercial and investment 
banking, but their regulation remained separate and for the most part outside of the purview of 
government. 
 Financial derivatives eventually broke out of Chicago and spread around the globe, and that 
mobility was facilitated in part by the performance of financial economics.  But that growth and 
mobility could not have happened, at least not in the same form, without decades of work by 
Chicagoans—work that was less about market calculativeness, and more about socio-political 
legitimacy, the generation of wealth, and competition with other exchanges and cities.  It took 
twenty years of experimentation in New York before that city’s financiers began to significantly 
compete with Chicago, but by then the Chicagoans had set the stage. 
 
5.   Conclusion: Back to Polanyi’s paradox 
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In presenting this abbreviated case study I have attempted to show how a Polanyian 
approach to markets, or one that is dependent upon an “wider frame of reference” must be 
supplemented with an approach that takes seriously the internal logic by which markets function as 
price mechanisms.  This is to say that the wider frame of reference is necessary, but not sufficient to 
comprehend markets.  As Polanyi alluded, when the wider frame of reference is heavily influenced 
by market calculation, we may find that the institutions surrounding it are increasingly reframed by 
the means of the market, as opposed to the broader ends of a humanized economy.  It is worth 
repeating that Polanyi struggled with the challenge of analyzing markets that have become 
institutionally separated from social, moral, and political institutions, and developed their own 
autonomous zone.  This is why performativity thesis should play a more central role in economic 
geography (see Barnes 2008, Berndt and Boeckler 2009, 2011), especially those looking for 
innovative ways to break apart the black box that is “the market” (Peck 2012, Hall 2012).  There are, 
however, a number of pitfalls along the path to performativity.  These ought to be considered 
carefully especially by those interested in promoting alternative market forms or alternative 
economic systems all together. 
By over-emphasizing the mechanics of markets and the science of economics as the key 
agentic force, performativity can easily distract researchers from other important components of 
market construction (Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2007), not least the larger institutional and geographic 
context.  Most importantly, however, is the tendency of performativity to ignore power relations and 
politics in their discussion of markets.  Many scholars that have put Callon’s theoretical framework 
to work have produced nuanced discussions that include considerations of history, political 
influence, and institutional embeddedness (MacKenzie 2006, Millo 2007, Preda 2009). Callon’s 
theorizing, however, tends to deliberately ignore these conditions (see Miller 2002). 
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As discussed above, Callon insists that markets necessarily construct their own contexts.  
MacKenzie, although he is much more open to alternative explanations, similarly suggests that 
financial economics has created its own worlds (2004).  These arguments dissolve society, geography 
and history into disembedded market agencements, and as a result, leave too little room to consider 
alternative exchange systems, or resistance to market construction.  Judith Butler (2010) reminds us 
that J.L. Austin in his original conception proposed two types or performativity, illocutionary and 
perlocutionary.  The former are speech acts that actually change the world, such as when a judge 
utters the words, “I thee wed”.  Even this utterance is dependent upon acceptance of a certain 
discourse and set of conditions, but it nevertheless actualizes a certain reality in the utterance itself.  
The perlocutionary is different.  While the speech itself may have causal effects, it is highly 
dependent upon all sorts of subsequent actions and interactions, and may in fact often fail to bring 
about any distinct change in reality.  Butler’s point is that failure, or “misfire” is a crucial component 
of performativity and that the perceived agentic “sovereignty” of an actor should not be analytically 
over-extended.  Attributing too much transformative potential to the agencement surrounding the 
science and practice of economics forces Callon and MacKenzie to erase geography, history, and 
power to make room for the intervention of the performance.  This concern remains despite 
Callon’s “overflows” or MacKenzie’s “counter-performativity”, both of which are based on the 
effects of successful market performances.  A successful methodology needs to consider not only 
the successful markets, but the markets that are not performed, the failed derivative contracts, the 
collateral requirements never enacted, the liquidity never established, and the social protections that 
are left behind. 
Responding to the criticism that the performativity project is deliberately and dangerously a-
political, Callon responds that the theory actually ought to be politically liberating (2010).  His 
explanation is that any economy can be performed, and politically minded people ought to stop 
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critiquing neo-classical economics and start performing the economies they want.  MacKenzie 
echoes this in the last sentence of his book when he says the most important thing the 
performativity thesis spurs is the question “what sort of a world do we want to see performed?” 
(MacKenzie 2006: 275).  This is the exactly the misconception brought about by placing too much 
focus on the performative act and too little focus on the “wider frame of reference”.  It contributes 
to a situation where the conditions that determine which performances are successful and which 
performances fail, are silenced.  It is exactly these conditions that a holistic Polanyian approach 
demands we pay close attention to.  I am not suggesting we go too far to the opposite extreme and 
underestimate the agentic sovereignty of actors.  Indeed the world can and should be changed, possibly 
even though the performance of economic geographies (Barnes 2008), but this will only happen if 
the wider social, political and economic fields and institutions from which markets emerge are also 
changed.  While it is no easy task to tack between the inside and outside of markets, it is nevertheless 
what is needed in a critique of contemporary finance. 
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